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This paper identifies conditions under which, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium, 
destination- and origin-based indirect tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially Pareto 
improving in the presence of global public goods. The first condition (unrequited transfers 
between governments) requires that transfers are designed in such a way that the marginal 
valuations of the global public goods are equalized, whereas the second (conditional revenue 
changes) requires that the change in global tax revenues, as a consequence of tax 
harmonization, is consistent with the direction of inefficiency in global public good provision 
relative to the (modified) Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization results 
in redistributing the gains from a reduction in global deadweight loss and any changes in 
global tax revenues according to the Pareto principle. And this is the case independently of 
the tax principle in place (destination or origin). 
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The establishment of the European Common Market in the 1960s, and its transformation
into the European Union Internal Market in the early 1990s, recognized the need for
(some form of) tax harmonization of national tax systems.1 The reason for this has
stemmed from the fact that indirect taxation can constitute an immediate barrier to
the free movement of goods, or freedom to provide services, in a single market. They
can also distort competition, with adverse e®ects on the e±cient allocation of resources.
One set of issues behind the recognition for the need of tax harmonization concerned
the treatment of movement of initial taxes towards a common target-tax. This issue|
and, consequently, the welfare implications of indirect tax harmonization|has received
considerable attention by the academic literature during the last two decades.
The ¯rst step towards formally evaluating such a consideration was taken by Keen (1987,
1989) who established that a move of destination-based commodity taxes (commodi-
ties are taxed by|and revenues accrue to|the country that ¯nal consumption takes
place) towards an appropriately weighted2 tax average would indeed generate potential
Pareto improvements. Subsequently, such a conclusion|but for a di®erent weighted3
tax average|was also shown to hold under the origin principle of taxation (commodities
are taxed by|and revenues accrue to|the country that produces them), Lopez-Garcia
(1996).
A limitation of this early work, however, concerned with the allocation of tax revenues:
Tax revenues were returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion and, thus, potentially
important e®ects through public good expenditure were ignored. Delipalla (1997) incor-
porated local public goods into the framework of Keen (1987) and showed that the Keen's
(1987) tax-harmonizing reforms under the destination principle can lead to a potential
Pareto improvement4 under a fairly restrictive condition: That of the tax-harmonizing
reforms satisfying conditional revenue neutrality.5 This is also true under the origin
principle of taxation, Kotsogiannis, Lopez-Garcia and Myles (2005).6
The case of imperfectly competitive markets has also received some attention|Keen and
Lahiri (1993), Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-M¿ller (2002), and Kotsogiannis and Lopez-
Garcia (2007)|verifying, to a large extent, the conclusions, regarding the desirability of
tax harmonization, derived by the earlier literature.7
1The EC Treaty, and under Article 93, speci¯cally provides for the European Union Council of
Ministers to adopt provisions for the harmonization of Member States' rules in the area of indirect
taxation. Indeed, tax harmonization has been quite pronounced for indirect taxation, following the
adoption of a common VAT tax system that is based on the approximation of tax rates.
2The weights being the demand responses of the participating countries.
3The weights, under the origin principle, being the supply responses of the participating countries.
4See also Lahiri and Raimondos-M¿ller (1998), and Lopez-Garcia (1998).
5Conditional revenue neutrality requires that, conditional on the tax-harmonizing reforms, global
tax revenues remain unchanged.
6Lockwood (1997), specializing the production technology, has established alternative conditions for
Pareto-improving harmonization.
7Keen and Lahiri (1998) investigate the welfare consequences of switching from the destination to the
1With the risk of oversimpli¯cation, a common theme that emerges from the contributions
that have explicitly considered local public goods (either within a perfectly or imperfectly
competitive environment) is that tax harmonization might be more di±cult to deliver
Pareto improvements in the presence of such goods.8 While this is generally true (and
the analytics in this paper will con¯rm it), it does not mean that tax harmonization
is a policy that should not be pursued. To the contrary, tax harmonization combined
with an appropriate way of allocating revenues may be (and indeed will be shown to
be) a potentially Pareto improving ¯scal policy.9 And this is the objective of this paper:
To revisit the issue regarding the desirability of tax harmonization, but to do so from
a di®erent perspective: That of global public goods.10 In particular, this paper asks:
Does, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium, a particular and popular form of
tax-harmonization deliver potential Pareto improvements under global public goods? If
not, what additional elements are required to support a Pareto improvement? And,
¯nally, does the answer to the above questions hinge upon the tax principle, destination
or origin, in place?
The issue of global public goods and tax harmonization has been entirely overlooked in
the literature. This neglect is rather surprising given that: (a) There is a wide range
of public goods that share the characteristics of global public goods (the most obvious
ones being environmental clean up, measures for the prevention of infectious diseases,
and world peace and international security), and (b) the convergence of tax systems is
still an issue that is high on the policy agenda.11
The analytics show that, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium, harmonization of
taxes towards a weighted average target-tax does generate Pareto improvements, but it
does so|unless global public goods are provided following the Samuelson rule|under
two conditions: Availability of unrequited transfers between governments and conditional
revenue changes that are consistent with the direction of ine±ciency in global public good
provision relative to the Samuelson rule. The ¯rst condition, as will be seen later on,
implies that transfers are designed in such a way that the overall gains from the provision
of global public goods are distributed among countries, whereas the second ensures that
origin principle. This analysis has been extended to include trade costs (Hau°er, Schjelderup and Stahler
(2000)), and product di®erentiation (Hau°er and P°uger (2004), and Hashimzade, Khovadaisi and Myles
(2005)). There is an extensive literature that compares destination- and origin-based commodity taxes.
Lockwood (2001) presents an excellent uni¯ed account of the early literature.
8This, in some sense, is not very surprising given that tax harmonization is not designed to account
for the ine±ciencies arising from the intensity of preferences of consumers over public goods, but it is
only designed to deal with the welfare gains arising from a reduction in global deadweight loss that
stems from the convergence of taxes towards an appropriately weighted average.
9There is a fairly sizeable literature dealing with the welfare implications of intergovernmental trans-
fers (lump sum/equalization-formula based or both). The principle underlying these transfers is that
the (central) government has the responsibility to ensure a more equitable distribution of public goods
across jurisdictional units. On this see, among others, Wildasin (1989, 1991), and Smart (1998, 2007).
The transfers here perform a similar role.
10The model is, in fact, general enough to encompass the case in which the public goods exhibit local
characteristics. We turn to this later on.
11For a recent contribution, a ¯rst of this short, that discusses issues of e±cient provision of global
public goods, see Sandmo (2006).
2any excess revenue gains (or losses) to be had, conditional upon the tax-harmonizing
reforms, is distributed in such a way that the ine±ciency in global public good provision
is mitigated. Under these conditions, tax harmonization results in a potential Pareto
improvement. And, interestingly, this is true|as will be shown later on|independently
of the tax principle in place (destination or origin). This result reinforces, in some
sense, the initially held belief of both academics and policy commentators that tax
harmonization is desirable. But such statement, the analysis here will show, needs to be
quali¯ed: Tax harmonization, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium, is desirable
as long as it is supplemented with a simple form of transfers between governments and
the reforms deliver the appropriate conditional revenue changes.
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides the background against
which the analysis is developed. Sections 3 deals with destination-based indirect tax har-
monization, whereas Section 4 analyzes origin-based indirect tax harmonization. Section
5 summarizes and concludes.
2 A simple model
The issues identi¯ed in the preceding discussion will be addressed within an imperfectly
competitive environment. The reason for this is that in most markets ¯rms are neither
so small as to e®ectively take the market price as given (as in perfectly competitive
markets) nor are there many cases of private-sector ¯rms without any competition (as
in the monopolistic markets). The predominant market form is indeed oligopoly.
The model is that of Kotsogiannis and Lopez-Garcia (2007), extended to allow for non-
linear demand and cost functions, and it has also been appropriately modi¯ed to deal
with global public goods.
The world consists of two countries conveniently called `home' and `foreign' (variables
pertaining to the foreign country being indicated by an asterisk) with a single represen-
tative consumer residing in each. Each country produces two tradeable goods. The ¯rst
one is produced under constant returns to scale by a perfectly competitive ¯rm that uses
a single factor of production that is ¯xed in supply.12 This good is taken as the numeraire
in both countries. The second good is homogenous and is produced by a single ¯rm in
each country. The consumer price for this good in the home (foreign) country is denoted




0(Q) < 0 (D
¤0(Q
¤) < 0) : (1)




0(X) > 0 (C
¤0 (X
¤) > 0) and C
00(X) ¸ 0 (C
¤00 (X
¤) ¸ 0) ;
(2)
where X (X¤) is the quantity produced by the home (foreign) ¯rm.
12Since the factor is ¯xed in supply it is suppressed from the analysis.
13Derivatives are denoted by primes.
3The tradeable good may be supplied by the ¯rm of either the home or the foreign country
and so either country can be an exporter or importer. Market clearing for the world,
however, requires that
D + D
¤ = X + X
¤ : (3)
Events in the model unfold as follows. In stage one, governments set taxes.14 In stage
two, and given taxes, ¯rms make their production decision holding Nash conjectures
against each other. Then pro¯ts, tax revenues and utilities are realized.
We now turn to, starting from the destination, the two principles of taxation.
3 Destination principle of taxation
When both countries follow the destination principle of taxation, arbitrage requires that
producer prices across countries are equalized. Denoting the international price by P,
consumer prices are then given by
Q = P + td ; Q




d) is the speci¯c tax rate on consumption in the home (foreign) country. Pro¯ts
for the home country ¯rm, denoted by ¦, and for the foreign country ¯rm, denoted by
¦¤, are given, respectively, by





The revenues obtained from taxing the demand of the tradeable good in each country are
used to provide a non-tradeable public good, denoted by G (G¤) in the home (foreign)
country. These goods are termed global public goods and both have the characteristic of
being `pure' in the Samuelson sense: That is, the enjoyment of the public good by the
citizen in the home (foreign) country does not diminish its availability for the citizen in
the foreign (home) country. The use of unrequited transfers (in terms of the numeraire
good) between governments will be initially assumed away and introduced only when
required. Given that td (t¤
d) and D(D¤) are the destination-based tax and demand in the
home (foreign) country, respectively, public good provision in the two countries is given
by15





The per-unit cost of public good in both countries is ¯xed and, for simplicity, normalized
to be equal to 1.16
14As noted earlier, the analysis will not restrict attention to a particular tax equilibrium, but will
seek to characterize the welfare implications of tax-harmonization starting from any tax distorting
equilibrium. Because of this, the type of conjectures held by the governments will be left unspeci¯ed.
15Of course, di®erent public goods require a di®erent modeling framework. Here it is taken that the
global public goods a®ect the utility of consumers and not the production capabilities of ¯rms.
16Notice that the analysis is not concerned with which country will provide the public good. What it
is concerned with is whether, given that countries provide global public goods, tax harmonization can
deliver a potential Pareto improvement. Consequently, the assumption that both countries are equally
e±cient in the production of global public goods is not a restrictive one.
4The private goods are perfect substitutes and so the world price P depends only on the
world production X + X¤. Substituting (4) into (1) and that into (3) one obtains
P (X + X
¤) ; (7)




¤0) < 0 ; (8)
where the inequality follows from the property of the demand functions in (1).
Firms maximize pro¯ts, taking the ¯scal instruments of the two countries as given,








Pro¯ts in each country are assumed to accrue to the representative consumer of that















where CS(Q) (CS¤(Q¤)) is the consumer's surplus (the utility obtained from purchasing
the private good at price Q (Q¤)), and ¡(G;G¤) (¡¤(G¤;G)) is the utility from global
public goods in the home (foreign) country.18
The e®ect on home welfare19 of an arbitrary reform, following from (11), then, is








Equation (12) shows that home country utility is a®ected by a number of e®ects. The
¯rst one, given by X ¡ D, is the terms of trade e®ect: If the home country exports the
good, and so X > D, then an increase in the price of the good increases home welfare
and reduces, since, in this case X¤ ¡ D¤ < 0, the foreign one. The second e®ect, given
by P ¡C0, re°ects the production e±ciency of the home ¯rm: The deviation, that is, of
the international price of the good produced in the home country from the domestic cost
of producing it. The third e®ect, given by ¡G ¡ 1, relates to the deviation of the home
country public good provision between the marginal bene¯t and the marginal cost of the
public good (excluding the bene¯t it confers to the foreign country). The fourth e®ect
relates, too, to public good provision: A change in demand, at initial taxes, changes
revenues valued at the margin by the home consumer by ¡G. The term ¡G¤D¤ relates to
17Second order conditions are assumed to hold. Appendix A discusses, though brie°y, issues related
to the stability of the equilibrium in the Cournot competition stage of the model.
18The underlying assumption here is that utility is additively separable between the (sub)utility from
private and public goods, with the (sub)utility function associated with private goods being quasi-linear
(with the linear part being the utility derived from the consumption of the numeraire good). Notice
also that (11) does not place any restriction on the relationship between G and G¤.
19Where appropriate, and for brevity, the expressions for the foreign country, being analogous to the
home country ones, are omitted.
5the change in utility because of the global nature of the public good the foreign country
provides: An increase in the tax rate of the foreign country increases tax revenues there
by D¤ and so public good provision in the foreign country valued by the home country
citizen by ¡G¤. Finally, the last term re°ects, too, the e®ect of foreign global public good
provision on home utility: With the foreign country tax being ¯xed at the pre-reform
level, an increase in foreign country's demand increases its tax revenues and so its global
public good provision (valued again by ¡G¤).
The evaluation of these e®ects, and so the evaluation of (12), under a tax-harmonizing
reform is the central issue of this paper. Attention now turns to the tax-harmonizing
reforms.
Destination-based tax-harmonizing reforms
The theoretical literature referred to in the introductory section has looked primarily
at a tax-harmonizing reform that features a convergence of the initial taxes towards
a common target-tax, with the target-tax being an average of the initial taxes. The








Ã (Hd ¡ td)




where ± is a small positive number and Ã; Ã¤ are arbitrary but positive numbers. The
target-tax Hd is a weighted average of the existing tax structures|where the weights
depend upon the local demand responses D0 and D¤0|and is given by20
Hd =
ÃD0









ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0 (t
¤





ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0 (t
¤







Equation (17) has an interesting implication. It implies that (a claim shown in Appendix
A) the international price P, and so the world supply of the tradeable good X + X¤,
remain unchanged (and so does world demand). It is, thus, intuitive that, in this case,
the welfare consequences of tax harmonization will depend upon the distortion imposed
on world consumer surplus as well as the revenue impact (appropriately weighted by the
20It has to be noted that the tax-harmonizing reform in (13) is more general than the one that has
frequently appeared in the literature, and in particular in Keen (1987, 1989). The generality here stems
from the fact that the convergence of taxes is not uniform but it is weighted by Ã and Ã¤. Notice
also that the weights of the target-tax Hd, given by ÃD0=(ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0) and Ã¤D¤0=(ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0),
are|following from the fact that D0;D¤0 < 0 and Ã;Ã¤ > 0|strictly positive.
6marginal valuation of the global public goods) of tax harmonization. Indeed this is the
case.
To see this take (12) and add it to its foreign counterpart to obtain, after using (17) and
the fact that the reforms imply dP = dX = dX¤ = 0,
dV + dV
¤ = [(¡G + ¡
¤
G ¡ 1)(Q=e + td) ¡ (¡
¤








ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0 (t
¤
d ¡ td) ; (18)
where e = D0Q=D (e¤ = D¤0Q¤=D¤) denotes the home (foreign) country's price elasticity
of demand.
Condition (18) shows that the welfare consequences of tax harmonization, starting from
any tax distorting equilibrium, depend upon the balance of three terms.
The ¯rst term in (18), and given by (¡G + ¡¤
G ¡ 1)(Q=e + td), gives the impact of the
tax-harmonizing reforms on world welfare, an impact that depends on the deviation of
the home country's global public good provision from the Samuelson rule (weighted by
Q=e+td, an expression that relates to the change in the home country's revenues). The
second term, given by (¡¤
G¤ + ¡G¤ ¡ 1)(Q¤=e¤ + t¤
d), gives, too, the impact of the tax-
harmonizing reforms on global welfare, an impact that depends on the deviation of the
foreign country's public good provision from the Samuelson rule (weighted by Q¤=e¤+t¤
d,
which relates to the change in the foreign country's revenues). The third term, given by
t¤
d ¡ td, is not related to global public good provision but gives the (di®erence in the)
change of deadweight loss, for given international price, due the change in consumer
prices in both countries (as a consequence of tax harmonization).
Close inspection of the terms identi¯ed in the preceding paragraph shows that their
balance|and so the existence of potential Pareto improvements|cannot be easily es-
tablished. The di±culty arises from the ¯rst and second terms, which capture the revenue
impact of the change in the tax bases in the two countries, as a consequence of tax har-
monization. And these are terms that the tax-harmonizing reforms are not designed to
account for.21
One natural benchmark case to consider is that in which public goods are provided
according to the (modi¯ed) Samuelson rule and so ¡G + ¡¤
G = 1 for the home country
and ¡¤
G¤ +¡G¤ = 1 for the foreign country. This is clearly an extreme case, and to some
extent implausible, but it does transparently remove e®ects arising from the ine±ciencies






ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0 > 0 ; (19)
and so it is only the impact of the tax-harmonizing reform on global deadweight loss that
matters for welfare. This has some straightforward intuition. Since the tax-harmonizing
reforms imply that the home country (but also the world supply of) production (and so
21It can be shown that, in general, reforms that deliver potential Pareto improvements do exist. It is
the identi¯cation of these reforms, however, that is the di±cult task. On this see Karakosta (2009).
7the international price of the tradeable good) remains constant at the pre-reform level,
tax harmonization implies that there is no change in pro¯ts and so in utility. What is
left, therefore, is the change in the deadweight loss from consumption. But this confers
an unambiguous gain to consumers. The reason for this is that, with the world price of
the tradeable good being unchanged, global deadweight loss is reduced by convergence
of taxes towards a weighted average of the initial taxes.22 To emphasize:
Proposition 1 With taxes being levied under the destination principle and public goods
being global, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium in which t¤
d 6= td, the tax-
harmonizing reforms in (13) and (14) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if both
countries follow the (modi¯ed for the case of global public goods) Samuelson rule of
global public good provision.
In one sense, this result strengthens the argument in favor of tax harmonization. But it
is the explicit recognition that the level of global public good provision will in general
di®er from that required by the Samuelson rule that ought to concern us. This concern,
however, it will be emphasized shortly, will reinforce the view for the need of a proper
role of a simple form of intergovernmental transfers.23
Suppose now that there exist unrequited transfers between governments that can be
optimally set at a stage before tax harmonization takes place. These transfers can
be rationalized by assuming that there is some intervention of some outside agency (for
example, a supranational government). While this agency can make use of such transfers
(in an optimal sense and satisfying its budget constraint), it cannot decide on tax issues.
This, in some sense, is consistent with the working of the European Union: While
European Union decision-making on tax matters requires unanimity (implying that tax-
harmonization will only be implemented if it delivers a potential Pareto improvement,
a requirement imposed in the present analysis) intergovernmental transfers do not. In
this case, it can be straightforwardly veri¯ed that maximization of (18) implies that24
¡G + ¡
¤
G = ¡G¤ + ¡
¤
G¤ ´ Ed ; (20)
and so, as one would expect, the marginal valuations for the global public goods are
equalized. In this case (18) reduces to
dV + dV





ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0 ; (21)
where d(G + G¤) denotes the change in global revenues as a consequence of tax harmo-
nization given by
d(G + G






ÃD0 + Ã¤D¤0 : (22)
22This is the exact analogue of Kotsogiannis and Lopez-Garcia (2007), carrying over unchanged to
the case in which tax revenues ¯nance global public goods.
23And in particular so within the European Union where this particular form of tax harmonization
has been central in policy discussions during the last two decades.
24To see this, notice that in this case (6) becomes G = tdD+B for the home country and G¤ = t¤
dD¤¡B
for the foreign (where B denotes unrequited transfers in terms of the numeraire good). Perturbing (18)
with respect to B implies that dV +dV ¤ = [(¡G + ¡¤
G) ¡ (¡G¤ + ¡¤
G¤)]dB which, upon setting equal to
zero, gives (20).
8(21)|together with (22)|shows that there is an appealing way of expressing what is
required for destination-based tax harmonization to deliver a potential Pareto improve-
ment: All is required is that, conditional on the tax-harmonizing reforms, the direction
of ine±ciency in global public good provision (relative to the Samuelson rule) takes
the same sign as the direction of the change in global tax revenues: If global public
goods are underprovided (overprovided) relative to the Samuelson rule, in the sense that
Ed > 1 (Ed < 1), and also, following from (22), d(G + G¤) > 0 (d(G + G¤) < 0), then
dV +dV ¤ > 0 and so tax-harmonization delivers a potential Pareto improvement. There
is a simple intuition behind this result. Tax harmonization not only reduces global dead-
weight loss (the second term in the right-hand-side of (21)) but also changes global tax
revenues in such a way that there is an e±ciency gain, relative to the Samuelson rule, in
global public good provision in the two countries (the ¯rst term in the right-hand-side
of (21)). Summarizing the preceding discussion:25
Proposition 2 With taxes being levied under the destination principle and public goods
being global, starting from any tax equilibrium in which t¤
d 6= td, the tax-harmonizing
reforms in (13) and (14) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if there exist unrequited
transfers that can be optimally set, and the tax-harmonizing reforms are conditional
revenue increasing (decreasing) when the global public goods are underprovided (overpro-
vided) relative to the Samuelson rule.
Outside this case (and the one emphasized in Proposition 1), it is still possible to identify
situations in which the tax-harmonizing reforms deliver a potential Pareto improvement,
even without the use of unrequited transfers. Suppose, to see this, that td > t¤
d, that is
the home country is the high tax one, and both countries underprovide the global public
good|with respect to the Samuelson rule of Proposition 1|in the sense that ¡G+¡¤
G > 1
and ¡G¤ +¡¤
G¤ > 1. Then (13) and (14) entail a potential Pareto improvement whenever
Q=e + td > 0 and Q¤=e¤ + t¤
d < 0. The reason for this is intuitive once one realizes that
Q=e + td and its foreign counterpart are associated with the e®ects of a small change
in tax rates on each country's tax revenue, that is d(tdD)=dtd = (Q=e + td)(De=Q). In
e®ect, the tax-harmonizing reform implies a reduction (an increase) in the tax rate of
the high (low) tax country which is also the one for which the marginal e®ect on revenue
is negative (positive). This, in turn, results in a revenue gain for both countries which,
coupled with the underprovision of the global public goods in both countries, implies
that dV + dV ¤ > 0.26
Interestingly, the conclusions reached thus far regarding the desirability of tax harmoniza-
tion hold|again starting from any tax distorting equilibrium|even if governments pro-
vide local public goods. In the present framework, this will be the case if ¡¤
G = ¡G¤ = 0.
Unrequited transfers between governments are still needed here in order to equalize the
25Suppose for instance|something that, arguably, seem to be a very restrictive requirement|the
reforms are conditional neutral (as in Delipalla (1997)). In this case d(G + G¤) = 0, implying that the
welfare loss of one country (as a consequence of tax harmonization) is exactly o®set by the welfare gain
of the other. In this case (18) reduces to (19) and so the tax-harmonizing reforms in (13) and (14)
deliver a potential Pareto improvement.
26Of course, similar reasoning applies to the case where both countries overprovide|or one country
underprovides and the other overprovides|the public good with respect to the Samuelson rule.
9marginal valuation for local public goods consumption (and not internalize global ex-
ternalities as in the case of global public goods), replacing (20) with ¡G = ¡¤
G¤ ´ Ed.
With equalized marginal valuations, the conditions on global revenues identi¯ed pre-
viously still hold, making sure that the change in global revenues (conditional on the
tax-harmonizing reforms) take the appropriate direction, conferring a positive welfare
gain. To emphasize:
Corollary 1 With taxes being levied under the destination principle and public goods
being local, starting from any tax equilibrium in which t¤
d 6= td, the tax-harmonizing re-
forms in (13) and (14) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if there exist unrequited
transfers that can be optimally set, and the tax-harmonizing reforms are conditional rev-
enue increasing (decreasing) when the local public goods are underprovided (overprovided)
relative to the Samuelson rule.
We turn now to the case in which products are taxed in the country of origin.
4 Origin principle of taxation
The analysis in the case of origin-based taxation parallels that of the destination-based
taxation. To economize on space, we brie°y state the necessary modi¯cations of the
model to deal with this case.
Origin-based taxes are levied by (and revenues accrue to) the country in which the com-
modity is produced. International arbitrage then dictates that consumer prices across
countries are equalized. Denoting the international price of the good by Q and the
speci¯c tax in the home (foreign) by to (t¤
o), ¯rms maximize
¦ = (Q ¡ to)X ¡ C(X) ; ¦






Making use of (1) and (3) gives the aggregate inverse demand given by
Q(X + X
¤) ; (24)














Revenues are used to provide public goods





With income given by ¦ and indirect utility given by (11), the e®ect on home welfare of
an arbitrary reform is given by
dV = (X ¡D)dQ+(Q¡to¡C








To address the welfare e®ects of a tax-harmonizing reform we relate the change of wel-
fare to the tax-harmonizing reform. We turn now to a discussion of origin-based tax-
harmonizing reforms and to a search of potential Pareto improvements.
10Origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms
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where ± is a small positive number, Ã;Ã¤ are arbitrary positive numbers and Ho|the

















00 < 0 ; A
¤ = Q
0 ¡ C
¤00 < 0 ; (31)
with the inequality sign following from the fact that Q0 < 0;C00;C¤00 ¸ 0. Interestingly,
the (strictly positive) weights attached to the origin-based taxes in (30) depend upon























Notice that (a claim shown in Appendix B) the implication of (33) is that world-consumer
price, Q, is una®ected, and as a consequence both countries' demands are una®ected,
too.
Adding now expressions (28) and its foreign analogue|after using (32)|one obtains
dV + dV
¤ = [(¡G + ¡
¤
G ¡ 1)(to + AX) ¡ (¡
¤











o ¡ to) : (34)
The level of generality of (34)|as was the case under the destination principle of
taxation|posses a signi¯cant problem in the attempt to evaluate the welfare conse-
quences of the origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms in (29) and (30). In this case too,
however, there are instances in which the reforms, starting from any tax distorting equi-
librium t¤
o 6= to, attain a potential Pareto improvement.
One such instance is when global public good provision follows the (modi¯ed) Samuelson
rule in both countries (in the sense that ¡G + ¡¤
G = 1 and also ¡¤
G¤ + ¡G¤ = 1). In this









o ¡ to) : (35)
27This is in contrast to the linear demand and constant marginal cost case analyzed in Kotsogiannis
and Lopez-Garcia (2007) where the weights A and A¤ vanish leaving dto = ¡dt¤
o.
11Inspection of (35) reveals that the origin-based tax-harmonizing reform is potentially
Pareto improving whenever C¤0 ¡ C0 has the opposite sign of t¤
o ¡ to, that is if and only
if the high tax country is also the country with the lower marginal cost of producing
the tradeable good. This has some straightforward intuition. Notice that, as already
noted, the tax-harmonizing reforms ensure that the world consumer price remains at the
pre-reform level and as a consequence the demands in both countries remain unchanged.
What changes, as a consequence of tax harmonization, is the production pattern of the
tradeable good across the two countries. Suppose, without loss of generality, that t¤
o > to
and so it is the foreign country that is the high tax one. It is thus the case that, following
(35), dV + dV ¤ > 0 if and only if the foreign country is the country that produces the
tradeable good more e±ciently, in the sense that C0 > C¤0. Since tax harmonization calls
for a reduction in t¤
o (and an increase in to), what e®ectively the tax reform does is to
reallocate production from the home country (the ine±cient one) to the foreign country
(the e±cient one). To emphasize:
Proposition 3 With taxes being levied under the origin principle and public goods being
global, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium in which t¤
o 6= to, the tax-harmonizing
reforms in (29) and (30) deliver a potential Pareto improvement if both countries follow
the (modi¯ed for the case of global public goods) Samuelson rule of global public good
provision and sign[C¤0 ¡ C0] =sign[to ¡ t¤
o] (that is, if the country with the ine±cient
¯rm is also the low tax country).
Outside the case emphasized by Proposition 3 (and the more general cases identi¯ed
shortly below) ine±ciencies from global public good provision will still linger making the
welfare e®ects of tax harmonization indeterminate. A policy that improves this, as noted
earlier for the destination case, is the use of unrequited transfers that can be optimally
set|implying that ¡G + ¡¤
G = ¡G¤ + ¡¤
G¤ ´ Eo|but also the tax-harmonizing reforms
to satisfy a condition on global revenue change whose sign is in accordance with the
underprovision/overprovision of global public goods, relative to the Samuelson rule. To
identify these rewrite (34) as
dV + dV








o ¡ to) ; (36)
where
d(G + G









o ¡ to) : (37)
Thus, it is the case that dV + dV ¤ > 0 if the change in global tax revenues (conditional
on the reforms) d(G + G¤) takes the sign of Eo ¡1 but also C¤0 ¡C0 takes the opposite
sign of t¤
o ¡ to. Summarizing:
Proposition 4 With taxes being levied under the origin principle and public goods being
global, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium in which the country with the inef-
¯cient ¯rm is also the low tax country, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (29) and (30)
deliver a potential Pareto improvement if there exist unrequited transfers that can be
optimally set, and the tax-harmonizing reforms are conditional revenue increasing (de-
creasing) when the global public goods are underprovided (overprovided) relative to the
Samuelson rule.
12Outside the cases emphasized in Propositions 3 and 4, it is still possible (as with the
destination principle) to identify situations in which the tax-harmonizing reform delivers
a potential Pareto improvement even without recourse to unrequited transfers. To see
this, suppose that t¤
o > to and C¤0 < C0|that is it is the foreign country that is both the
high tax and the most e±cient one|and both countries underprovide the global public
good|with respect to the Samuelson rule of Proposition 3|in the sense that ¡G+¡¤
G > 1
and ¡G¤+¡¤
G¤ > 1. Then, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (29) and (30) deliver a potential
Pareto improvement whenever to + AX < 0 and t¤
o + A¤X¤ > 0. The reason for this
is that to + AX (and its foreign counterpart) relate to the marginal impact of the tax-
harmonizing reform on each country's revenues, that is d(toX)=dto = (to+AX)=Q0. The
implication of the tax-harmonizing reform, then, is that it increases (decreases) the tax
rate of the low (high) tax country, which is also the country for which the marginal e®ect
on revenue is positive (negative). This implies that both countries gain in revenues and,
therefore, in global public good provision.28
Tax harmonization is also desirable|again starting from any tax distorting equilibrium|
even if governments provide local public goods. The reason is as before: Unrequited
transfers between governments are still needed here in order to equalize the marginal
valuations from local public good consumption (and not internalize global externalities
as in the case of global public goods), replacing (20) with ¡G = ¡¤
G¤ ´ Eo. With equal-
ized marginal valuations, the conditions on global revenues identi¯ed previously still hold,
making sure that the change in global revenues (conditional on the tax-harmonizing re-
forms) takes the appropriate direction, conferring a positive welfare gain. It is, thus, the
case that:
Corollary 2 With taxes being levied under the origin principle and public goods being
local, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium in which the country with the ine±cient
¯rm is also the low tax country, the tax-harmonizing reforms in (29) and (30) deliver a
potential Pareto improvement if there exist unrequited transfers that can be optimally set,
and the tax-harmonizing reforms are conditional revenue increasing (decreasing) when
the local public goods are underprovided (overprovided) relative to the Samuelson rule.
The results established emphasize that, interestingly, tax harmonization in the presence
of public goods deserves more attention than it has typically received. There is certainly
pause for thought in the simple fact that a combination of tax harmonization and a
proper role for a way to allocate global revenues can increase aggregate welfare.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced global public goods in an imperfectly competitive framework
and identi¯ed reasonably plausible conditions under which, starting from any tax distort-
ing equilibrium, destination- and origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially
Pareto improving. The ¯rst condition (unrequited transfers between governments) re-
quires that transfers are designed in such a way that the overall gains from the provision
28Similar reasoning applies to the case where both countries overprovide|or one country underpro-
vides and the other overprovides|the public good with respect to the Samuelson rule.
13of global public goods are distributed among countries, whereas the second one (con-
ditional revenue changes) ensures that any excess revenue gain (or loss) to be had is
distributed in accordance with the extent of underprovision/overprovision of global pub-
lic goods, relative to the Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization
results in a potential Pareto improvement. And, interestingly, this is true independently
of the tax principle in place (destination or origin).
One can certainly question the feasibility of optimal unrequited transfers (more than
the requirement for conditional revenue changes) that redistributes the gains of tax
harmonization.29 Though this appears certainly to be an unwanted additional ¯scal
instrument that works independently of tax harmonization, it is something that multi-
country ¯scal systems (like the European Union) cannot dispense with. For, given the
tax base asymmetries that exist between the coordinating countries, there is always a
need for allocating resources between them e±ciently. In ¯scal federal systems|like,
for example, Canada|such reallocation of revenues takes place via intergovernmental
transfers between governments that accounts for the deviation of a jurisdictional unit's
tax base from the national tax base. The system of allocation of revenues between
governments adopted here is the simplest one that one can thing of, thereby increasing
the attractiveness of tax-harmonization.
What is, thus, important, is that one does not take a negative view of tax harmonization.
To the contrary, as the analysis has shown here, careful ¯scal policy can harness the
strengths of tax harmonization for the social good.
29It is nevertheless used widely in the literature. See also footnote 9.
14Appendices
Appendix A
Proof of the statement that the reform in (13) and (14) implies that dP =
dX = dX¤ = 0.
Re-write, for convenience, the market clearing condition in (3) and the ¯rst order con-
ditions in (9) and (10) given by, respectively,
D + D
¤ = X + X
¤ ; (A.1)
P




¤ + P = C
¤0 : (A.3)
Equations (A.1)-(A.3) de¯ne the equilibrium of output and the world price of the trade-
able good. Notice that su±ciency for the choice of X and X¤ requires, respectively,
that
¦XX ´ ®d = 2P
0 + XP
00 ¡ C










¤00 < 0 : (A.5)
It is also assumed that
¦XX¤ ´ ¯d = P
0 + XP








00 < 0 ; (A.7)
and so the ¯rms' best response function are downward sloping in quantity space. Stability





d > 0 : (A.8)
Perturbation (abusing notation somewhat) of (A.1)-(A.3)|after using the fact that,
following from the demand functions, dD = D0 (dP + dtd) (dD¤ = D¤0(dP + dt¤
d)), but
also that P 0 = (D0 + D¤0)
¡1|gives in matrix form
2
4
1 ¡P 0 ¡P 0
1 ®d ¡ P 0 ¯d ¡ P 0
1 ¯¤
d ¡ P 0 ®¤


















It can be easily veri¯ed that the determinant of the left-hand-side matrix is given by
(A.8). As is typically the case, without further restrictions on the structure of the
model the comparative statics are indeterminate. This, in the present context, is not
problematic: All that is required here is that the comparative statics are `well de¯ned'
in the sense that the coe±cients of the components of D0dtd + D¤0dt¤
d, are non-zero. It
is assumed this to be the case. Solving the system of equations in (A.9) for dP;dX and
dX¤ one obtains
dP = ¡
¢d ¡ P 0 [(®d + ®¤



























15Close inspection of (A.10) reveals that if D0dtd+D¤0dt¤
d = 0, then, dP = dX = dX¤ = 0.
¤
Appendix B
Proof of the statement that the reform in (29) and (30) implies that dQ = 0.
Re-write, for convenience, the market clearing condition in (3) and the ¯rst order con-
ditions in (26)
D + D











Equations (B.1)-(B.3) de¯ne the equilibrium of output and the world price of the trade-
able good. Notice that su±ciency for the choice of X and X¤ requires, respectively,
that
¦XX ´ ®o = 2Q
0 + XQ
00 ¡ C










¤00 < 0 : (B.5)
It is also assumed that
¦XX¤ ´ ¯o = Q
0 + XQ








00 < 0 , (B.7)
and so the ¯rms' best response function are downward sloping in quantity space. Stability





o > 0 : (B.8)
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®o ¡ ¯o = Q
0 ¡ C
00 ´ A ; (B.14)
it is the case that, following from (33), the origin-based tax-harmonizing reforms imply
that dQ = 0. ¤
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